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NOTE AND COMMENT
ATTAcHMiN s ox UNLIQUIDA'r-D DXMANDS.-If the cretlitor should not
have the aid of attachment to recover on unliquidated demands, why not?
It is true that attachment as a security for the satisfaction of the judgment
that may be recovered in an action pending or just commenced was unknown
to the general common law of England, and existed only in a restricted
form as a special custom of London and other places in the form of gar-
nishment till it was introduced into the New England colonies by an early
statute of Massachusetts, whence its utility commended it so that it was
soon adopted in all the colonies. Therefore, it may be said that if
there is no authority for attachment on unliquidated demands under the
statute there is no authority at all-that the proceeding is purely statutory,
and authority must be found in the statute for each case.
But this argument does not apply to the point now under discussion under
any of the statutes so far as we are aware; for whether the statute permits
attachment "in any action on contract," or "in any action for the recovery
of money only," or "in any action for the ricovery of damages," which are
some of the most common statutory forms of expression, actions for un-
liquidated damages are as much included within the terms of the statutes as
actions on liquidated demands. This argument, when applied to this class
of cases works to the opposite conclusion. The argument when applied to
this class of cases would be, that it is for the legislature to say what cases
they will extend the new remedy, and it is not for the court to deny it if the
legislature has given it, though inconvenience may follow. The fact is that
this old stock argument against attachments and garnishments in all debata-
ble cases never was much heard on this class of cases. Why then has not
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the remedy been allowed on unliquidated demands generally? Should we
not rather say, remedial statutes should be so construed as to advance the
remedy?
The rule that attachment does not lie in aid of suits on unliquidated de-
mands was first declared in the case of Fisher v. Consequa, 2 Wash. C. C.
382, Fed. Cas. No. 4816, by Justice WASHINGTON in the circuit court of the
United States for the district of EPennsylvania, in i8og; and was occasioned
by the fact that the statute under which the attachment issued in that case
allowed the remedy only to-recover a debt; and in disposing of the question
Justice WASHINGTON said: "It must be admitted, that, according to a strict
and literal construtcion of the act of assembly, the foreign attachment is
confined to cases of debt. * * * What is a debt? In strict law language,
it is a precise sum due by express agreement, and does not depend upon any
after calculation to ascertain it. The remedy for recovery of it is by action
of debt, and frequently by action of indebitatus assumpsit. But is this the
only case within the mischief intended to be remedied by the law? * * *
The uncertainty of the sum due, does not, in the common understanding of
mankind, render it less a debt. A promise, whether express or implied, td
pay as mucb as certain goods or labor are worth, or as much as the same
kind of goods may sell for on a certain day, or at a certain market ; or to
pay the difference between the value of one kind of goods and another,
creates, in common parlance, a debt; and the person entitled to performance
does not speak of his claim as for damages, but for a debt, to the amount
which he considers himself entitled to. But it is not every claim that, upon
a fair construction of this law, or even in common parlance, can be denom-
inated a debt. For, in the first place, the demand must arise out of a con-
tract, without which no debt can be created; and the- measure of the dam-
ages must be such as the plaintiff can aver by affidavit to be due; without
which, special bail (which the defendant, by giving, may dissolve the attach-
ment) cannot regularly be demanded. It follows from this that a foreikn
attachment will not lie for demands which arise ex delicto, or where special
bail cannot be required." And therefore it was held that the attachment was
proper in that case, which was for delivering tea inferior to contract.
It will be observed that the court in this case gave a very liberal interpre-
tation to the statute, and in fact stretched it to cover the case. Thus the law
stood for ten years; when he case of Clark v. Wilson (18ig), 3 Wash. C. C.
56, Fed. Cas. No. 2841, came before the same court and judge, under the
same statute; and in this case the court held that the statute could not be
extended to sustain an attachment in an action for damages for refusal to
employ plaintiff's ship on a voyage to Montevidio at £67o per month or frac-
tion thereof; and in referring to Fisher v. Consequa in that case, Justice
WASHINGTON said: "The principle decided in that case was, that a demand
arising ex contractu, the amount of which was ascertained, or which was
susceptible of ascertainment by some standard referable to the contract it-
self," sufficiently certain to enable the pliantiff by affidavit to aver it, or a
jury to find it; might be the foundation of a proceeding by way of foreign
attachment, without reference to the form of action, or to the technical
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definition of debt, the expression used in'the law. * * * This then, is a
case, in which unliquidated damages are demanded, in which the contract
alleged as the cause of action affords no rule for ascertaining them, in
which the amount is not, and cannot with propriety be, averred in the affi-
davit, and which is and must be altogether uncertain until the jury have
ascertained it, for which operation no definite rule can be presented to them."
This is the rule that has been declared since in the courts that have held at-
tachment not to lie on unliquidated demands. Thus a rule laid down in
giving a liberal construction to a narrow statute has been applied in giving
a strict construction in the face of the express words of statutes which war-
ranted no such limitation. The decisions on the question are very numerous,
and in nearly or quite half of the states, a rule has been established as above
stated without anything in the statute to warrant the limitation. In a few
states it is squarely held that the fact that the demand sued on is not for
liquidated damages is no objection to the attachment, since the judge can
limit the amount to such sum as he deems reasonable.
In Michigan the rule laid down in the case of Clark v. Wilson was recog-
nized but held not applicable, in the early case of Roelofson v. Hatch, 3
Mich. 277; and in the recent case of Showen v. . L. Owens Co. (Oct 4,
I9go), - Mich. -, i22 N. W. 64o, the court has again recognized the rule,
and again held it inapplicable, sustaining an attachment in an action for
damages for breach of warranty of machinery as sound and suitable for a
purpose. J. R. R.
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